

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 OSLO 01253 01 OF 02 221648Z

41

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 056809

R 221556Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7995

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USNATO 1268

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 OSLO 1253

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NO, UR, US, SV

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE U.S. STEPS TO STRENGTHEN NORWEGIAN  
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SVALBARD/BARENTS SEA AREA, PART II

REF: OSLO'S 1233

1. IN PART I, THE AMBASSADOR PROPOSED THAT WE EXAMINE WHAT MEASURES IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST TO TAKE TO STRENGTHEN NORWEGIAN SOVEREIGNTY ON SVALBARD AND IN THE BARENTS SEA. WHAT WE MIGHT DECIDE TO DO WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A WIDER RANGE OF NOT ALWAYS COMPATIBLE INTERESTS: OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE SVALBARD TREATY, OUR BROADER POSITION ON LAW OF THE SEA, OUR POSSIBLE ECONOMIC INTEREST IN DRILLING ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OFF SVALBARD UNDER THE FAVORABLE TERMS OF THE TREATY, OUR CONCERN TO ENSURE FREE PASSAGE IN THE BARENTS SEA, OUR EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR.

2. THE STEPS SUGGESTED BELOW ARE SOME THAT COME TO MIND WHICH APPEAR TO BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR BROADER INTERESTS, BUT THE DEPARTMENT IS IN A BETTER POSITION TO MAKE THIS JUDGMENT. IN HIS DISCUSSION OF THIS GENERAL PROBLEM WITH DCM, MGA'S POLAR ADVISER BUCHER-JOHANNESSEN EXPRESSED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN CERTAIN STEPS, WHICH ARE FLAGGED BELOW WITH THE PARENTHETICAL COMMENT (SPECIAL INTERESTS).

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PAGE 02 OSLO 01253 01 OF 02 221648Z

3. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME AMONG THE POSSIBLE STEPS WHICH MIGHT

HELP STRENGTHEN NORWAY'S HAND IN ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS SOVIET NEIGHBOR:

A. SUPPORT FOR SVALBARD TREATY:

(I) NORWAY MIGHT SEND CIRCULAR NOTE TO THE SIGNATORIES OF THE 1920 TREATY EITHER SIMPLY INFORMING THEM OR PERHAPS ASKING FOR THEIR COMMENTS ON A RANGE OF ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES WHICH IT HAS TAKEN ON SVALBARD, TO WHICH USSR OBJECTS. IN EFFECT, IT WOULD BE SOLICITING STATEMENTS OF APPROVAL AND SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY FROM THE U.S.--THEREBY UNDERSCORING INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN WHAT HAPPENS ON SVALBARD AND SUPPORT FOR NORWEGIAN SOVEREIGNTY.

(II) NORWAY MIGHT RESTRICT ITS CIRCULAR NOTE TO THE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT QUESTION OF AIR TRAVEL, ASSERTING THAT ALL COUNTRIES MUST RECEIVE NORWEGIAN PERMISSION TO FLY TO OR OVER SVALBARD OR OPERATE PLANES ON THE ARCHIPELAGO. THE SOVIETS REJECT THIS INTERPRETATION OF THE PARIS TREATY, ARGUING INTER ALIA THAT ARTICLE 3 ON FREEDOM OF ACCESS AND ENTRY ALLOWS THEM TO OPERATE THEIR HELICOPTERS FROM THEIR COAL MINING ENCLAVE WITHOUT SPECIFIC NORWEGIAN PERMISSION. THE NORWEGIANS HAVE EXPRESSED THE HOPE INFORMALLY THAT WE SUPPORT THEIR POSITION. IF WE CAN AGREE WITH THE NORWEGIANS, THIS WOULD STRENGTHEN THEIR HAND. BUT IF, WE AGREE WITH THE SOVIETS (THIS SPECIFIC ASPECT OF THE ISSUE IS NOT ANSWERED BY DEPTELS 411 AND 555 OF MARCH 26 AND JUNE 6, 1966), THEN WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE NORWEGIANS TO BACK OFF NOW BEFORE THEY DEEPEN THE CURRENT CONFRONTATION OVER THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET RIGHT TO OPERATE HELICOPTERS.

(III) (SPECIAL INTEREST). A U.S. SPOKESMAN MIGHT FIND AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF NORWEGIAN SOVEREIGNTY ON SVALBARD AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE 1920 TREATY; AN OPPORTUNITY COULD BE CREATED E.G. BY A PLANTED QUESTION AT THE DAILY NOON PRESS BRIEFING CONCERNING SVALBARD AND OUR VIEWS OF PRIME MINISTER BRATTELI'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

(IV) IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL, IF THE OPPORTUNITY AROSE TO SAY THE SAME THING PRIVATELY TO THE SOVIETS, BEING CAREFUL,  
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PAGE 03 OSLO 01253 01 OF 02 221648Z

HOWEVER, NOT TO SUGGEST SOME DRAMATIC NEW AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE BARENTS SEA.

B. PRESENCE OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS.

(I) (SPECIAL INTEREST). ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, WHICH IS IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE NORWEGIAN PLAR INSTITUTE, TO INCREASE THE FREQUENCY OF VISITS

BY AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC DELEGATIONS OR INDIVIDUAL SCIENTISTS  
AND THEIR LENGTH OF STAY ON SVALBARD. (BEARING IN MIND THAT THE  
FOREIGN MINISTER SOME YEARS AGO ASKED THAT U.S. AIR FORCE FUNDING  
OF RESEARCH RELATED TO SVALBARD BE HALTED, WE THINK IT BEST NOT  
TO ENCOURAGE THE NAVY INTEREST REFERRED TO IN PARA 3 OF STATE  
36470.)

(II) SPECIAL INTEREST. ORGANIZATION OF A PORT VISIT  
TO SVALBARD BY A U.S. COAST GUARD OCEANOGRAPHIC VESSEL, SIMILAR  
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PAGE 01 OSLO 01253 02 OF 02 221656Z

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ACTION SS-30

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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 OSLO 1253

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
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SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SVALBARD/BARENTS SEA AREA, PART II

(II) STATOIL WOULD BE WISE TO AT LEAST CONTRACT WITH  
AMERICAN FIRMS FOR SEISMIC SURVEYS, IF NOT DRILLING OFF SVALBARD,  
TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST AND U.S. PRESENCE  
IN THE AREA.

D. AIRPORT AND TOURISM.

(I) THE REGULAR PRESENCE OF AMERICAN TOURISTS ON  
SVALBARD COULD PARTIALLY OFFSET THE HEAVY SOVIET PRESENCE ON THE ARCH  
IPELAGO  
AND GET THE USSR ACCUSTOMED TO THE IDEA THAT SVALBARD IS NOT A  
PRIVATE PRESERVE. ONCE THE AIRPORT IS COMPLETED AND THE HOTEL  
IS CONSTRUCTED THERE, SVALBARD MIGHT USEFULLY BECOME A REGULAR  
STOP FOR SUMMER TOURISTS FLIGHTS, INCLUDING AMERICAN CHARTERS.  
(THE STRONG ECOLOGICAL LOBBY IN NORWAY IS RESISTING, HOWEVER,  
THE IDEA OF TOURISM ON SVALBARD.)

(II) IF THERE WERE SUFFICIENT INTEREST IN AIR TRAVEL  
TO SVALBARD SOME AMERICAN TOURIST OR AIR LINE COMPANY MIGHT  
EVENTUALLY ASK TO HAVE A REPRESENTATIVE LOCATED DURING THE  
SUMMER MONTHS AT THE NEW AIRPORT, PARTIALLY BALANCING THE

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PAGE 02 OSLO 01253 02 OF 02 221656Z

5-6 REPRESENTATIVES OF AEROFLOT.

E. NAVAL MANEUVERS. MORE FREQUENT SMALL JOINT NAVAL  
EXERCISES WITH U.S. AND OTHER NATO VESSELS IN THE GENERAL  
AREA BETWEEN NORTH NORWAY, JAN MAYEN, AND SVALBARD WOULD  
SERVE TO REMIND THE SOVIETS THAT SVALBARD, BEING NORWEGIAN,  
FALLS WITHIN THE NATO TREATY AREA--AND TO REASSURE THE  
NORWEGIANS THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC IS NOT A MARE  
SOVIETICUS. THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN  
THE NUMBER OF NAVAL EXERCISES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC SINCE  
1964, PROVIDING QUESTIONS FROM NORWEGIAN NAVAL OFFICERS AND  
ENCOURAGING THE FREQUENTLY HEARD ARGUMENT THAT NORWAY NOW  
FALLS BEHIND THE SOVIET FORWARD NAVAL DEFENSE LINE.

4. OBVIOUSLY, WHAT WE MAY DECIDE TO DO TO SUPPORT NORWAY'S  
POSITION IN THE ARCTIC WILL DEPEND ON HOW WE PERCEIVE OUR OWN  
STAKE THERE, AND OUR POSTURE IN RELATION TO NORWAY'S  
CAUTIOUS EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE  
USSR. FOR POLICY OR PRACTICAL REASONS, WE MAY NOT WISH OR  
FEEL WE CAN USEFULLY PURSUE CERTAIN COURSES OF ACTION. IT  
IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT WE BE CLEAR IN OUR OWN MINDS NOW  
WHAT OUR POSITION IS ON THE SVALBARD TREATY (CONTINENTAL SHELF,  
AIR ACCESS), SO THAT WE WILL KNOW WHERE, IF AT ALL, OUR INTERESTS  
CLASH  
WITH NORWAY'S AND IN WHAT WAYS WE CAN OFFER THE NORWEGIANS  
MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT. SOME PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION OF OUR  
INTEREST IN SVALBARD IS CERTAINLY IMPORTANT TO NORWAY. BUT  
EQUALLY IMPORTANT, BY DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS WITH THE NORWEGIANS,  
WE BOTH STRENGTHEN THEIR SENSE OF CONFIDENCE IN US AS AN ALLY  
AND REMIND THEM TO TAKE U.S. AS WELL AS SOVIET INTERESTS  
INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS.

5. CABLE WAS APPROVED IN DRAFT BY THE AMBASSADOR BEFORE HIS  
DEPARTURE.  
BUCHANAN

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
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**Draft Date:** 22 MAR 1974  
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**Disposition Authority:** garlanwa  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
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